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OPINION OF THE COURT 
 
COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
James C. Gibbs, Jr. ("taxpayer"), executor of the estate of 
James C. Gibbs, Sr., initiated this action in the District 
Court for the District of New Jersey against the United 
States for a refund of estate taxes paid under the recapture 
tax provision of S 2032A of the Internal Revenue Code. The 
lawsuit turns on the resolution of a question offirst 
impression: did taxpayer dispose "of any interest" in his 
family farm by granting the State of New Jersey a 
development easement in that farm in exchange for $1.4 
million? The district court, relying on New Jersey state law, 
answered in the negative and granted summary judgment 
to taxpayer. 
 
Contrary to the district court, we conclude that, under 
applicable federal law, the grant of a development easement 
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was a disposition of an interest in the farmland. 
Accordingly, we will reverse. 
 
I. 
 
James C. Gibbs, Sr. owned and operated a dairy farm at 
the time of his death on November 7, 1984. At that time, 
the property had a fair market value of $988,000 based on 
its highest and best use. Its highest and best use, however, 
was not as a dairy farm, but for development. If the 
property could only be used for farming purposes, its value 
was $349,770. 
 
Taxpayer was the executor of his father's estate and its 
sole heir. On July 24, 1985, he filed an estate tax return on 
behalf of the estate. In that return, pursuant to S 2032A of 
the Internal Revenue Code, taxpayer elected to value the 
real property component of the farm based on its special 
use as farmland instead of its highest and best use for 
development. This election resulted in tax savings of 
$218,328. In making this election, taxpayer, as required 
under the statute, agreed to be personally liable for any 
additional estate tax due (the "recapture tax") if he disposed 
of any interest in the property within ten years of his 
father's death. 
 
On December 21, 1993, taxpayer and the State of New 
Jersey executed a "Deed of Easement" pursuant to which 
New Jersey received a development easement in the 
farmland and taxpayer received $1,433,493.72.1 New Jersey 
purchased this development easement pursuant to the 
"Agriculture Retention and Development Act," N.J. Stat. 
Ann. SS 4:1C-11 to 48 ("Agriculture Retention Act"), which 
was enacted, among other reasons, to strengthen New 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
1. Although not expressly articulated in the New Jersey statute, 
development easements are closely akin to the more commonly 
referenced "conservation easements," which one commentator has 
described as "interests in land that represent the right to prevent the 
development or improvement of the land for any purpose other than 
conservation." Vivian Quinn, Preserving Farmland with Conservation 
Easements: Public Benefit or Burden?, 1992/1993 Ann. Surv. Am. L. 
235, 238 (1994); see also Uniform Conservation Easement Act S1(1), 12 
U.L.A. 170 (1996) (defining conservation easement). 
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Jersey's agricultural industry and to preserve farmland in 
the State. See N.J. Stat. Ann. S 4:1C-12 (setting forth 
legislative findings). In conjunction with related legislation, 
the Agriculture Retention Act created a state agriculture 
committee to oversee New Jersey's conservation efforts, and 
county agricultural boards to carry them out. See N.J. Stat. 
Ann. SS 4:1C-4, 4:1C-14. The committee and boards are 
authorized to "acquire development easements, [and] to 
purchase fee simple absolute title to farmland for resale 
with agricultural deed restrictions for farmland preservation 
purposes." N.J. Stat. Ann. S 4:1C-8; see also N.J. Stat. Ann. 
S 4:1C-31. 
 
The Deed of Easement specifies that the "Grantor" of the 
easement is James C. Gibbs, Jr., both in his individual 
capacity and as executor of the estate, along with his 
daughter, Diane Gibbs; the Warren County Board of 
Chosen Freeholders -- acting as an arm of the State of New 
Jersey -- is designated as the "Grantee."2 The operative 
language of the Deed of Easement is as follows: "The 
Grantor, Grantor's heirs . . . successors and assigns grants 
and conveys to the Grantee a development easement" on 
the farmland. It also provides that "[a]ny development of the 
Premises for nonagricultural use is expressly prohibited," 
and that such restrictions "shall be construed as a 
restriction running with the land and shall be binding upon 
any person to whom title to the Premises is transferred." In 
the following provision, the Deed of Easement makes clear 
that the development rights in the property are transferred 
to New Jersey: 
 
       Grantor ... further transfer[s] and conveys to Grantee 
       all of the nonagricultural development rights and 
       development credits appurtenant to the lands and 
       Premises described herein. Nothing contained herein 
       shall preclude the conveyance or retention of said 
       rights by the Grantee as may be permitted by the laws 
       of the State of New Jersey in the future. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
2. For the sake of clarity, we will hereafter refer to the State of New 
Jersey as the recipient of the Deed of Easement, rather than the Warren 
County Board of Chosen Freeholders. 
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Taxpayer and the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") 
disagreed as to whether this conveyance was a disposition 
of an interest in the property for purposes of triggering the 
S 2032A recapture tax. Taxpayer paid the $159,823 
recapture tax and filed a claim for refund with the IRS. 
After the IRS denied taxpayer's claim, he filed the present 
suit in the district court seeking a refund of the entire 
recapture tax. 
 
Following the parties' cross-motions for summary 
judgment, the district court held for taxpayer. At issue, the 
court recognized, was whether the sale by taxpayer of the 
development easement was a disposition of an interest in 
property that triggered the recapture tax. In resolving this 
question, the district court first observed that under the 
applicable New Jersey statute, a development easement is 
considered an "equitable servitude" and not a true 
easement. The district court then looked to the New Jersey 
law of equitable servitudes and determined that New Jersey 
follows the minority rule that treats equitable servitudes as 
creating contract rights, not property rights. Based on this, 
the district court ruled that taxpayer did not part with a 
real property interest in granting the development easement 
to the state. Accordingly, the court held that the sale of the 
development easement was not a "dispos[ition] of any 
interest" in the farmland under S 2032A, the tax recapture 
provision was not triggered, and taxpayer was owed a 
refund of $159,823 plus statutory interest. In a subsequent 
decision, the court denied taxpayer's motion for attorneys' 
fees under 26 U.S.C. S 7430 on the ground that the 
government's litigation position, while incorrect, was 
substantially justified given that the case was one of first 
impression and involved complex issues of statutory 
interpretation. 
 
The United States appeals from the order of the district 
court to award taxpayer a refund of the recapture tax, and 
taxpayer cross-appeals from the denial of attorneys' fees. 
The district court had jurisdiction pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 
S 7422 and 28 U.S.C. S 1346(a)(1). We have jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. S 1291. We exercise plenary review 
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over the district court's grant of summary judgment. Reitz 
v. County of Bucks, 125 F.3d 139, 143 (3d Cir. 1997).3 
 
II. 
 
As a general matter, in calculating estate taxes, the value 
of real property included in the gross estate of a decedent 
is its fair market value. See 26 U.S.C. S 2031; 26 C.F.R. 
20.2031-1(b). Section 2032A of the Internal Revenue Code 
is an exception to that general rule; it allows for certain 
family farms and other closely held businesses to be 
valued, for estate tax purposes, "according to its actual use 
(e.g., as a farm), rather than at its fair market value based 
on its highest and best use (e.g., as a housing development 
or a shopping mall)." Estate of Lucas v. United States, 97 
F.3d 1401, 1404 (11th Cir. 1996). The statute was intended 
to grant relief to the heirs of family farms who might 
otherwise find that valuation of inherited farmland at its 
fair market value would result in such large estate taxes 
that they would be required to sell the farm in order to pay 
the tax. See H.R. Rep. No. 94-1380, at 21-22 (1976), 
reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356, 3375-76; see also 
Williamson v. Commissioner, 974 F.2d 1525, 1527 (9th Cir. 
1992); Estate of Sherrod v. Commissioner, 774 F.2d 1057, 
1061-62 (11th Cir. 1985). By allowing this "special use" 
valuation, S 2032A is designed to encourage the 
continuation of family farms and other closely-held 
businesses. 
 
An estate must satisfy many conditions to obtain the 
benefits of S 2032A. See Estate of Lucas, 97 F.3d at 1404- 
05 (reviewing conditions). Only the recapture tax 
requirements of S 2032A(c)(1) are at issue here. That section 
provides: 
 
       If, within 10 years after the decedent's death and 
       before the death of a qualified heir -- 
 
       (A) the qualified heir disposes of any interest in 
       qualified real property (other than by a disposition to a 
       member of his family), or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
3. The Attorney General of the State of New Jersey has submitted an 
amicus curiae brief in support of the district court's decision. 
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       (B) the qualified heir ceases to use for the qualified use 
       the qualified real property which was acquired (or 
       passed) from the decedent, 
 
       then, there is hereby imposed an additional estate tax. 
 
Under this provision, a recapture tax must be paid if the 
qualified heir disposes of any interest in the property or 
fails to use the property for a qualified purpose within ten 
years from the decedent's date of death. As noted above, 
the district court held that the taxpayer did not owe the 
recapture tax under subsection (1)(A) of S 2032A because 
taxpayer's grant of a development easement to the State of 
New Jersey was not a "dispos[ition] of any interest" in his 
farmland. 
 
The United States contends that the district court erred 
in holding that taxpayer did not owe the recapture tax 
because, under New Jersey law, a development easement 
purportedly gives rise to contract rights as opposed to 
property rights. The government argues that once the 
district court determined that the development easement 
created rights that were recognized under state law, it 
should have turned to federal law to determine whether the 
transfer of those rights was a "dispos[ition] of any interest" 
that triggered the recapture tax. According to the United 
States, whether the interest created by the Deed of 
Easement was labeled a "contract right" or a"real property 
interest" under New Jersey law is irrelevant. 4 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
4. The United States argues in the alternative that the district court 
erred in its interpretation of New Jersey law. According to the 
government, under New Jersey law, a development easement is regarded 
as a true easement, giving rise to an interest in land, not as an 
equitable 
servitude giving rise to contract rights. It cites two principal 
authorities 
in support of this position. First, the New Jersey statute which created 
the development easement granted by taxpayer specifically provides that 
a " `[d]evelopment easement means an interest in land, less than fee 
simple absolute title thereto." N.J. Stat. AnnS 4:1C-13(f). Second, in a 
decision involving a property tax dispute over the value of land subject 
to a conservation easement, the New Jersey Supreme Court stated that 
"[c]onservation easements of the kind here considered are easements in 
gross." Village of Ridgewood v. Bolger Foundation, 517 A.2d 135, 137 
(N.J. 1986). 
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We agree with the government that the district court 
erred in predicating its decision on the manner in which 
development easements are classified under New Jersey 
law. It has long been recognized that the Internal Revenue 
Code creates "no property rights but merely attaches 
consequences, federally defined, to rights created under 
law." United States v. National Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. 
713, 722 (1985) (quoting United States v. Bess, 357 U.S. 
51, 55 (1958)). In applying a federal revenue act, therefore, 
"state law controls in determining the nature of the legal 
interest which the taxpayer had in the property." National 
Bank of Commerce, 472 U.S. at 722. However,"the state- 
law consequences of that definition are of no concern to the 
operation of the federal tax law." Id. at 723; see also Morgan 
v. Commissioner, 309 U.S. 78, 81 (1940) ("[i]f it is found in 
a given case that an interest or right created by local law 
was the object intended to be taxed, the federal law must 
prevail no matter what name is given to the interest or right 
by state law"); 21 West Lancaster Corp. v. Main Line 
Restaurant, Inc., 790 F.2d 354, 356 (3d Cir. 1986) ("[w]hile 
state law creates legal interests and defines their incidents, 
the ultimate question whether an interest thus created and 
defined falls within a category stated by a Federal statute 
requires an interpretation of that statute, which is a 
Federal question") (internal quotation omitted). 
 
The point is demonstrated by National Bank of 
Commerce, where the issue was whether the IRS had the 
right to levy on a jointly-held Arkansas bank account for 
delinquent federal taxes owed by only one of the account 
holders. 472 U.S. at 715. The governing statute, 26 U.S.C. 
S 6321, provided that: "[i]f any person liable to pay any tax 
neglects or refuses to pay the same after demand, the 
amount ... shall be a lien in favor of the United States upon 
all property and rights to property, whether real or 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
We believe that the district court's conclusion that a development 
easement is an equitable servitude and not a true easement under New 
Jersey law is questionable. Nevertheless, we need not reach that issue 
because, as explained infra, the district court's conclusion to base its 
holding on the doctrinal classification of development easements under 
New Jersey law was a more fundamental error. 
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personal, belonging to such person." Id. at 719. The case 
hinged on whether the delinquent taxpayer's interest in the 
joint account was "property" or "rights to property," within 
the meaning of S 6321. Looking to Arkansas law to define 
the nature of the taxpayer's interest in the property, the 
Supreme Court held that because state law provided that 
the delinquent taxpayer had an unrestricted right to 
withdraw funds from his joint account, the account was 
subject to levy by the IRS. Id. at 724. Further application of 
state law in this situation, according to the Court, was 
erroneous. In particular, the Court rejected the view that 
Arkansas' creditors' rights law could limit the IRS' power to 
levy, once it was determined that the joint account was 
taxpayer's property. Id. at 727. Attributing such importance 
to state law in the operation of a federal revenue act 
"misconceives the role properly played by state law in 
federal tax-collection matters." Id. 
 
The rationale of National Bank of Commerce suggests that 
New Jersey law is relevant here only to the extent that it 
defines the development easement that taxpayer deeded to 
the state. The state law consequences of that definition, 
however, as well as the state's doctrinal classification of the 
development easement -- be it as an easement, restrictive 
covenant, equitable servitude, or anything else-- have no 
bearing on the application of the recapture tax provision. 
See, e.g., Helvering v. Stuart, 317 U.S. 154, 162 (1942) 
("[o]nce rights are obtained by local law, whatever they may 
be called, these rights are subject to the federal definition 
of taxability"). Having determined that the development 
easement is recognized under state law, the district court 
should have turned to federal law to decide whether the 
transfer of the development easement constituted a 
"dispos[ition] of any interest" in taxpayer's farmland within 
the meaning of S 2032A. 
 
Taxpayer contends that the extent of the district court's 
reliance on New Jersey law in determining whether the 
transfer of a development easement triggers the recapture 
tax is required by Treasury Regulation S 20.2032A-8(c)(2), 
which provides, in part: 
 
       An interest in property is an interest which, as of the 
       date of the decedent's death, can be asserted under 
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       applicable local law so as to affect the disposition of the 
       specially valued property by the estate. Any person in 
       being at the death of the decedent who has any such 
       interest in the property, whether present or future, or 
       vested or contingent, must enter into the agreement. 
       . . . 
 
26 C.F.R. S 20.2032A-8(c)(2). Taxpayer claims that this 
regulation sets forth a test for determining whether a 
particular disposition triggers the recapture tax, and 
dictates that local law, not federal law, controls that 
determination. 
 
We disagree. Contrary to taxpayer's assertion, the plain 
meaning of Treasury Regulation S 20.2032A-8(c) does not 
purport to define the events that trigger the recapture tax. 
Instead, the regulation articulates who, at the time a 
S 2032A special use election is made, must sign the 
agreement to pay the recapture tax in the event that the tax 
becomes payable. See Estate of Lucas, 97 F.3d at 1407. 
Taxpayer cites no authority in support of his novel 
interpretation of the regulation, and we have found none. 
Even the district court, which agreed with taxpayer's 
assessment of S 2032A, concluded that the treasury 
regulations were "silent" on the question presented. 
Taxpayer's reliance on Treasury Regulation S 20.2032A- 
8(c)(2) is misplaced. 
 
III. 
 
What remains to be decided is whether taxpayer's 
transfer of the development easement in his farm to New 
Jersey constitutes a disposition of "any interest" within the 
meaning of S 2032A. In resolving this question, we do not 
have the benefit of precedent, as there are no published 
judicial opinions addressing this aspect of S 2032A. 
Nonetheless, relying on well-established principles of 
property law and estate taxation, we conclude that the 
conveyance of the development easement was a disposition 
of an interest in the farm. 
 
The property laws have long referred to the metaphor 
that owning property is like owning a "bundle of rights." 
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATC Corp., 
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458 U.S. 419, 435 (1982); see generally Gerald Korngold, 
Comparing the Concepts of `Property' and `Value' in Real 
Estate Law and Real Property Taxation, 25 Real Est. L.J. 7, 
9 (1996) (discussing the related "bundle of sticks" 
metaphor). Here, the real property that passed to taxpayer 
on the death of his father can be viewed in two portions: 
first, the "bundle of rights" relating to the agricultural use 
of the land, and second, the additional value represented by 
the "bundle of rights" relating to development uses of the 
land. Cf. Sullivan v. United States, 618 F.2d 1001, 1005 (3d 
Cir. 1980) (noting that "there is no theoretical obstacle to 
breaking up the bundle of rights that comprise a fee simple 
interest in property," and that when taxpayers "sever the 
rights incident to a fee interest . . . such interests may be 
treated separately for federal tax purposes"). 
 
If the special use provision of S 2032A did not exist, it is 
undisputed that taxpayer would have been required to pay 
estate taxes on the entire bundle of rights associated with 
the farm, including those rights related to the development 
of the land, when the property passed to taxpayer from his 
father. See 26 U.S.C. S 2033 (defining the gross estate to 
include "the value of all property to the extent of the 
interest therein of the decedent at the time of his death"). 
Taxpayer avoided paying estate taxes on the bundle of 
rights associated with the development uses of the land by 
electing to value the farm under the special use provision. 
He did so on the understanding that he would not realize 
the value of those rights within the ten year recapture 
period. In executing the Deed of Easement, however, 
taxpayer conveyed to New Jersey "all of the nonagricultural 
development rights and development credits appurtenant to 
the lands and premises." In exchange for these valuable 
development rights, taxpayer received consideration of over 
$1.4 million. Through this transaction, taxpayer disposed of 
valuable property rights that the Internal Revenue Code 
would have otherwise taxed when those rights were passed 
from taxpayer's father, but did not because of theS 2032A 
election. Because this disposition occurred within ten years 
of the decedent's death, the recapture tax was due. 
 
Taxpayer argues that he has not disposed of any interest 
in the farmland because the Deed of Easement conveyed 
 
                                11 
  
"nothing to anyone." Taxpayer's Br. at 9. Taxpayer asserts 
that the deed imposed land-use restrictions on the 
property, but did not convey any property interest to New 
Jersey. 
 
We are not persuaded by taxpayer's characterization of 
the transaction. At the core of his argument is the 
erroneous premise that the development easement is merely 
a land-use restriction, and not an interest in land. That, 
however, is contrary to the New Jersey Agriculture 
Retention Act, which defines a development easement as: 
 
       an interest in land, less than a fee simple absolute title 
       thereto, which enables the owner to develop the land 
       for any nonagricultural purpose as determined by the 
       provisions of this act . . .. 
 
N.J. Stat. Ann S 4:1C-13(f) (emphasis added). 
 
In addition to the statutory provision, the language of the 
Deed of Easement is quite clear that a sale of an interest in 
land has taken place. First, the Deed of Easement states 
that taxpayer "grants and conveys to the Grantee a 
development easement on the Premises . . . for and in 
consideration of the sum of $1,433,493.72." Second, the 
deed provides that taxpayer "transfer[s] and conveys to 
Grantee all of the nonagricultural development rights and 
development credits appurtenant to the lands and Premises 
described herein."5 Third, the deed references the 
Agriculture Retention Act, which clearly contemplates the 
sale or conveyance of development easements. See N.J. 
Stat. Ann S 4:1C-24(a)(2) ("[a]ny landowner . . . may enter 
into an agreement to convey a development easement on 
the land to the board"); N.J. Stat. Ann S 4:1C-31(a) ("[a]ny 
landowner applying to the board to sell a development 
easement . . . shall offer to sell the development easement 
at a price which, in the opinion of the landowner, 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
5. As evidence that he did not sell anything to New Jersey, taxpayer 
points to one passage in the Deed of Easement that states that the 
document should be construed as a "restriction running with the land." 
Whatever the meaning of that provision, and we believe it is far from 
clear, it certainly does not contradict the statement in the Deed of 
Easement that taxpayer has conveyed to New Jersey all of the 
development rights associated with the property. 
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represents a fair value of the development potential of the 
land for nonagricultural purposes"). Accordingly, taxpayer's 
effort to recast the Deed of Easement as something other 
than a sale or conveyance of an interest in land is 
unavailing. 
 
Taxpayer also asserts that the fact that he is entitled to 
sell the farmland without the permission of the State of 
New Jersey demonstrates that he did not dispose of any 
interest in the farmland. We disagree. While the Deed of 
Easement does provide that "the land and its buildings 
which are affected may be sold [by taxpayer] .. . for 
continued agricultural use," it is also clear that taxpayer, 
as a consequence of the transaction, is no longer in a 
position to sell the nonagricultural rights associated with 
the farm. Those rights now belong to New Jersey. As stated 
in the deed: 
 
       Nothing contained herein shall preclude the 
       conveyance or retention of said [development] rights by 
       the Grantee as may be permitted by the laws of the 
       State of New Jersey in the future. 
 
Thus, anyone interested in using the property for 
development purposes must purchase those rights from the 
State. While taxpayer may still sell the agricultural rights 
associated with the farm, that does not alter the fact that 
taxpayer conveyed an interest in the property by execution 
of the Deed of Easement.6 
 
Taxpayer contends the Tax Court's decision in Williamson 
v. Commissioner, 93 T.C. 242 (1989), aff'd, 974 F.2d 1525 
(9th Cir. 1992), counsels that we affirm the district court. 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
6. In arguing that New Jersey purchased nothing by operation of the 
Deed of Easement, taxpayer makes much of the fact that under existing 
New Jersey law, the State may not sell a development easement. See N.J. 
Stat. Ann S 4:1C-32(a) ("[n]o development easement purchased pursuant 
to the provisions of this act shall be sold, given, transferred or 
otherwise 
conveyed in any manner"). That the statute currently precludes a 
transfer of a development easement by the State, however, does not 
mean that New Jersey does not own valuable rights capable of transfer; 
to the contrary, the statutory provision supports the conclusion that a 
development easement is an interest in land that could, but for the 
statute, be separately purchased and sold. 
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In that case, taxpayer Williamson entered into a cash lease 
of his farmland -- which had previously been the subject of 
a S 2032A election -- with his nephew. The Commissioner 
contended that the leasing of the property triggered the 
recapture tax because a cash lease was not a "qualified 
use" of the property under S 2032A(c)(1)(B). As an 
alternative argument, Williamson maintained that no 
recapture tax should be imposed because a lease was a 
"disposition" of the farmland, and a disposition of the 
farmland to a family member does not trigger the recapture 
tax under S 2032A(c)(1)(A). The court rejected that view, 
noting that Williamson did not dispose of any interest in 
the farm by entering into a lease with his nephew. Id. at 
251. Taxpayer asserts that this statement in Williamson 
supports his position that it is inappropriate to read 
S 2032A(c)(1)(A) literally, and that we should hold that a 
development easement is not the type of interest that 
Congress had in mind when they stated that the recapture 
tax was payable if a taxpayer "dispose[d] of any interest" in 
his qualified real property. 
 
Contrary to taxpayer's characterization of the case, the 
court in Williamson did not hold, and did not even suggest, 
that S 2032(c)(1)(A)'s "any interest" provision should not be 
interpreted literally. Instead, the court held that a lease was 
not a disposition of an interest in the farmland because a 
disposition "ordinarily refers to a sale, exchange, or gift." Id. 
at 252. Here, in contrast, there is no question that 
taxpayer's grant of a development easement was a 
permanent sale. Thus, Williamson is readily distinguishable 
from the instant case. Indeed, in affirming the Tax Court's 
decision, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit 
recognized as much by drawing a distinction between a 
temporary lease, which the court agreed did not qualify as 
a disposition, and the conveyance of an easement, which 
the court recognized would constitute a disposition because 
of its permanency. See Williamson, 974 F.2d at 1534. 
 
We also reject taxpayer's contention that the legislative 
history of S 2032A compels the conclusion that the 
recapture tax should not be triggered by the grant of a 
development easement. Initially, we note that scrutiny of 
the statute's legislative history is not necessary in this case 
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because we have determined, based on the plain meaning 
of the statute, informed by our understanding of relevant 
legal principles, that taxpayer's grant of a development 
easement was a disposition of an interest in his farm. See, 
e.g., Ford v. Schering-Plough Corp., 145 F.3d 601, 613 (3d 
Cir. 1998) (no cause to analyze statute's legislative history 
when its plain meaning is clear). Nevertheless, even if we 
were to consider the legislative history of S 2032A, we would 
reach the same conclusion. The relevant portion of the 
House Committee Report, addressing the need for the 
recapture tax provision, states: 
 
       [y]our committee recognizes that it would be a windfall 
       to the beneficiaries of an estate to allow real property 
       used for farming or closely held business purposes to 
       be valued for estate tax purposes at its farm or 
       business value unless the beneficiaries continue to use 
       the property for farm or business purposes, at least for 
       a reasonable period of time after the decedent's death. 
       Also, your committee believes that it would be 
       inequitable to discount speculative values if the heirs of 
       the decedent realize these speculative values by selling 
       the property within a short time after the decedent's 
       death. For these reasons, your committee has provided 
       for special use valuation in situations involving real 
       property used in farming or in certain other trades or 
       businesses, but has further provided for recapture of 
       the estate tax benefit where the land is prematurely 
       sold or is converted to nonqualifying uses. 
 
H.R. Rep. No. 94-1380 at 22 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356, 3376 (emphasis added). 
 
By including the recapture tax provision in S 2032A, it 
appears that Congress intended to prevent a taxpayer from 
obtaining a special use valuation on property for estate tax 
purposes, and then, by sale or other disposition within a 
relatively short period, obtaining the value of the property's 
highest and best use. In other words, Congress sought to 
prevent the exact result that taxpayer urges here: an heir to 
a family farm avoiding estate taxes on the nonagricultural 
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uses of the property and shortly thereafter reaping the 
monetary benefits of those same nonagricultural uses.7 
 
Both taxpayer and the Attorney General of New Jersey as 
amicus curiae argue that the legislative history of 
S 2032A(c)(1)(A) indicates that Congress intended the 
recapture tax to be triggered only by the sale of the entire 
property, not a portion thereof. We do not read the relevant 
committee reports to suggest such a result. See , e.g., H.R. 
Rep. No. 94-1380 at 26 (1976), reprinted in 1976 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 3356, 3380 ("Disposition . . . of a portion of 
an interest [in the qualified real property] may result in a 
full or partial recapture."). In any event, taxpayer's 
interpretation is foreclosed by the actual statutory language 
chosen by Congress, which provides that a recapture tax is 
owed if a taxpayer "disposes of any interest in the qualified 
real property." 26 U.S.C. S 2032A(c)(1)(A) (emphasis added). 
If Congress meant for the recapture tax to be triggered only 
by the sale of an entire fee simple interest, we must 
presume that it would have enacted language to that effect. 
See Connecticut National Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 
253-54 (1992) ("We have stated time and again that courts 
must presume that a legislature says in a statute what it 
means and means in a statute what it says there.").8 
_________________________________________________________________ 
 
7. We are aware that as part of the Taxpayer's Relief Act of 1997, S 508, 
Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, 860, Congress amended S 2032A to 
provide that a charitable contribution of a conservation easement does 
not trigger the recapture tax. See 26 U.S.C.S 2032A(c)(8) (West Supp. 
1998). The amendment does not affect the instant case for two reasons: 
first, the Deed of Easement at issue here was executed well before 
December 31, 1997, the effective date of the amendment, see S 508(e)(2), 
Pub. L. No. 105-34, 111 Stat. 788, 860; second, the amendment pertains 
to a charitable contribution of a conservation easement, but does not 
apply to an individual such as taxpayer, who sells a conservation 
easement for valuable consideration. 
 
8. For similar reasons, we cannot accept the Attorney General's 
argument that, even if taxpayer disposed of an interest in his property, 
we should still conclude that taxpayer does not owe the recapture tax 
because the purpose of S 2032A and the Agriculture Retention Act is to 
preserve farmland, and taxpayer's property is still being used as a farm. 
The Attorney General predicts that if we a hold that a recapture tax is 
due under the circumstances herein, farmers will be discouraged from 
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IV. 
 
The district court erred in holding that the grant of a 
development easement to the State of New Jersey by 
taxpayer did not constitute the disposition of any interest in 
property under 26 U.S.C. S 2032A(c)(1)(A). Accordingly, we 
will reverse the October 30, 1997 order of the district court 
and remand with instructions to grant summary judgment 
in favor of the United States. As taxpayer is no longer the 
prevailing party, we will dismiss as moot his cross-appeal 
challenging the district court's refusal to award attorneys' 
fees. 
 
Each party to bear its own costs. 
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selling development easements to New Jersey, which, in turn, will 
undermine the State's effort to conserve farmland. Essentially, the State 
asks us to disregard the express terms of a federal statute in order to 
further its policy objectives. This we are not free to do. See Estate of 
Applebaum v. Commissioner, 724 F.2d 375, 377 (3d Cir. 1983) (plain 
language of a statute cannot be ignored for policy reasons). 
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